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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA J. 
JOHANSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 6302 
Respondent's Reply Brief in 
Support of Petition for Rehearing 
I. 
WHEN THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIMED AND WERE 
AWARDED COMPENSATION FROM THE INSURANCE 
CARRIER THEY PRECLUDED THEMSELVES FROM 
OBTAINING ANY VESTED RIGHT OF THEIR OWN TO 
RECOVER DAMAGES FROM THE DEFENDANT. 
Upon the death of Robert Johanson whatever, if any, 
action he had for wrongful injury died with him. Prior 
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to the amendment of Section 5 of Article XVI of the Utah 
Constitution (Nov. 2, 1920), and the enactment of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, the heirs of the deceased, 
or his personal representative for the benefit of his heirs, 
had a right to maintain an action against any person who 
had wrongfully or negligently caused the death of Johanson 
(see Sec. 6505 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917). This 
statute, as~ a part of the Code of Civil Procedure, provided 
such a remedy, with the consequent right which resulted 
from that remedy so provided. The action thus created 
was purely statutory and entirely unknown to the common 
law. 
Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah, 
342; 213 Pac. 187 (1923) 
In this Platz case the Court said : 
"The cause of action here in question being 
purely statutory, it must necessarily follow that 
whenever the legislature has designated the agency 
authorized to enforce such right, its enactment pre-
cludes any other agency from enforcing the right 
or appealing to the courts for redress." 
Thorpe v. Union Pacific Goal Co., 24 Utah, 475; 
68 Pac. 145 (1902) 
But Robert Johanson's death occurred on June 3, 1938. 
On that date and ever since June 26, 1933, when the Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, took effect, Section 104-3-11 of the 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, (formerly Section 6505 
of the Compiled Laws! of 1917) by its express terms ex-
cepted such a case as this from its operation, and this 
l 
~,1[ 
Johanson case was and is controlled by Section 42-1-58 of I · 
the Revised Statutes of 1933. 
J 
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Under Section 42-1-58 of the Revised Statutes of 1933, 
upon the death of Robert Johanson on June 3, 1938, the 
plaintiffs, his dependents, had no vested rights. They had 
a choice of two remedies : ( 1) compensation from his em-
ployer or its insurance carrier, or (2) an action to re-
cover damages against defendant. When these dependents 
claimed and were awarded compensation they could not 
thereafter institute or maintain in their own right the ac-
tion to recover damages against defendant. Their acqui-
sition of the right to collect compensation precluded their 
acquisition of the right to recover damages. When they 
obtained the award of compensation their riglits were in 
all respects the same as if Section 42-1-58 had expressly 
provided that their remedy of compensation was alone and 
by itself an exclusive one. The fact that these dependents 
might receive some part of a judgment, if one was ob-
tained by the insurance carrier from defendant, did not vest 
in these dependents any interest in the action which said 
dependents declined to take. 
The plaintiffs, appellants here, in their brief contend 
that they, independent of any assignment by the insurance 
carrier, have an interest in the action against the defen-
dant; that this interest was vested in them at the time of 
the death of Robert Johanson. This was their theory at 
the time they were in the Federal Court in their first suit 
for $50,000, and it has been at all times· their theory in 
this second suit for $2950. The plaintiffs' claim that the 
insurance carrier made a waiver of its right to subrogation 
and an assignment of its cause of action against the defen-
dant is not primary but at most merely secondary; a sort 
of an anchor to the windward ; a last extremity. 
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That such is the contention of the plaintiffs is mani-
fest from their brief lately filed in this rehearing pro-
ceeding, and the cases cited in such brief from Nebraska 
and Minnesota. Those authorities are as follows: 
Thomas v. Otis Elevator Co., 103 Neb. 401; 172 
N. W. 53 (1919) 
Hugh Murphy Construction Co. v. Serck, 104 
Neb. 398; 177 N. W. 747 (1920) 
O'Donnell v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 114 Neb. 9; 
205 N. W. 561 (1926) 
In their opening brief the appellants cited MunCMter 
v. Graharrn Ice Cream Co., 103 Neb. 379; 172 N. W. 52 
(1919). 
For the purpose of giving a true viewpoint of the 
Nebraska law, the defendant cites: 
Luckey v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 117 Neb. 85; 
219 N. W. 802 (1928) 
Bronder v. Otis Elevator Co., 121 Neb. 581; 
237 N. W. 671 (1931) 
Goers v. Goers, 124 Neb. 720; 248 N. W. 76 
(1933) 
Graham v. City of Lincoln, 106 Neb. 305; 183 
N. W. 569 (1921) 
On Page 14 of plaintiffs' brief they pretend to quote 
the Nebraska statute, but they do not quote that statute in 
full. If they had read the statute instead of some case which 
quotes only in part, they would have found that as early 
as 1913 it provided: 
"Where a third person is liable to the employee 
or to the dependents, for the injury or death, the 
employer shall be subrogated to the right of the 
employee or to the dependents against such third 
person, and the recovery by such employer shall not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
be limited to the amount payable as compensation 
to such employee or dependents, but such employer 
may recover any amount which such employee or 
his dependents would have been entitled to recover. 
Any recovery by the employer against such third 
person, in excess of the compensation paid by the 
employer after deducting the expenses of making 
such recovery, shall be paid forthwith to the em-
ployee or to the dependents, and shall be treated as 
an advance payment by the employer, on account of 
any future installments of compensation." (Italics 
ours) (Omitted from Plaintiff's Brief) 
(C. 198, Sec. 18, Laws of Nebraska, 1913. This section 
was Sec. 3659 of the Revised Statutes of 1913 and 3041 
of the Compiled Statutes of 1922.) 
In 1929 the legislature of Nebraska, in order to make 
its intent clear, added the following proviso: 
"Provided, however, that nothing in this section 
or act shall be construed to deny the right of an 
injured employee or of his personal representative 
to bring suit against said third person in his own 
name or in the name of the personal representative 
based upon said liability, but in such an event an 
employer having paid or paying compensation to the 
said employee or his dependents shall be made a party 
to the suit for the purpose of reimbursement, under 
the above provided right of subrogation, of any 
compensation paid. Comp. St. 1929, Sec. 48-118." 
(C. 135, Laws of Nebraska, 1929, or Sec. 48-118 of 
the Compiled Statutes of 1929.) 
Plaintiffs cite the following Minnesota cases : 
City of Red Wing v. Eichinger, 163 Minn. 54; 
203 N. W. 622 (1925) 
McGuigan v. Allen, 165 Minn. 390; 206 N. W. 
714 (1925) 
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And for the purpose of giving a true viewpoint of 
the Minnesota Law, the defendant cites: 
Fidelity Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co., 
152 Minn. 197; 188 N. W. 265 (1922) 
Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548; 257 N. W. 
649 (1934) 
Dale v. Shaw Motor Co., 205 Minn. 99; 287 
N. W. 787 (1939) 
Gleason v. Sing, ______ Minn. ______ ; 297 N. W. 720 
(1941) (Not yet officially reported) 
Gile v. Yellow Cab Co., 177 Minn. 579; 225 
N. W. 911 (1929) 
In view of the fact that the statutes of Nebraska and 
Minnesota have statutory enactments similar in some re-
spects to those of the State of Wisconsin, defendant cites: 
Swanson v. Lake Superior Ry. Co., 195 Wis. 
633; 219 N. W. 274 (1928) 
Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Icke, 
225 Wis. 304; 274 N. W. 823 (1927) 
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Wisconsin 
Public Service Corp., 228 Wis. 441; 279 
N. W. 76 (1938) 
Standard Surety Co. v. Spewackek, 233 Wis. 
158; 288 N. W. 758 (1939) 
(Under the Minnesota statutes, third persons engaged 
in the furtherance of common enterprises or purposes with 
those of the employer may come within the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. "There is no statute in any other state 
similar to the last paragraph above quoted." Gile v. Yellow 
Cab Co., supra.) 
It ought to be a sufficient answer to the plaintiffs' 
contention, that they have an interest in the action against 
the defendant in their own right, and not as assignee, to 
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7 
point out that the decisions from the States of Minnesota 
and Nebraska are based upon statutes quite different from 
those in force in the State of Utah. These Minnesota and 
Nebraska cases make clear why the defendant is right in 
contending that the plaintiffs, by claiming and obtaining 
an award of compensation, under the Utah Statute cut 
themselves off from acquiring a rig'ht to, sue the defendant 
for damages, and why the insurance company, "having 
paid the compensation" thereby could become vested in its 
own right, not as an assignee, to sue for such damages. 
Counsel for plaintiffs have throughout this entire liti-
gation cited cases from other states without any apparent 
realization of the importance of the fact that a difference 
in statute results in a difference in decision. It is believed 
that an examination of the cases above cited will create a 
desire in the mind of every member of this court to avoid 
the difficulties that have been encountered by the courts 
of Nebraska, Minnesota and Wisconsin in applying and 
construing their laws providing for workmen's compen-
sation. 
It should be noted that in Minnesota the action for 
death by wrongful act is by statute a survival of the ac-
tion for personal injury (see Sections 9656, 9657, Minne-
sota Revised Statutes), and that only the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased may sue. In the States of Ne-
braska and Wisconsin causes of action for personal injuries 
have been assignable for many years, even long prior to 
the enactment of compensation laws. 
In the case of Hugh Murphy Construction Co. v. Serck, 
104 Neb. 398; 177 N. W. 747 (1920), the Nebraska Court 
said: 
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"There is no provision in the Nebraska statute, 
as in those of some states, requiring the injured 
employee to elect between claiming compensation 
under the statute and an action for damages against 
the negligent third party. The following cases sup-
port our conclusion:" 
The court then cites : 
McGarvey v. Independent Oil & Grease Co., 
156 Wis. 580; 146 N. W. 895 (1914) 
In Wisconsin causes of action for injuries survive, and 
for that reason are held to be property rights. (See Mc-
Garvey case.) 
Lehmann v. Deuster, 95 Wis. 185; 70 N. W. 170; 
37 L. R. A. 333 (1897) 
In this Lehmann case, cited in defendant's opening 
brief for rehearing, it was held that if the cause of action 
survived it was assignable, and the McGarvey opinion says: 
"Thus it will be seen that an ordinary claim for 
damages for a tortious injury to the person, not-
withstanding it was otherwise at common law, is a 
property right which may pass by assignment or 
operation of law, with the incidental right to a ju-
dicial remedy, by and in the name of, the real party 
in interest, to enforce it." (Italics ours) 
(This supports the defendant's definition of a prop-
erty right.) (See opening brief, P. 67.) 
In Minnesota it has been said that it is an open ques-
tion whether the contributory negligence of a workman 
who has received compensation from his employer can be 
asserted by a third party as a defense when sued by the 
employer to recover the amount of compensation paid (186 
N. W. 863; 2'46 N. W. 528) ; but in that state it was held 
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by a divided court that the third person might assert the 
employer's contributory negligence as a defens.e (246 N. 
W. 527). On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
held that the employer's contributory negligence could not 
be as~erted as a defense by the third person. 
There are other differences which might be pointed 
out, but in the main Nebraska, Minnesota and Wisconsin 
stand somewhat by themselves. Although it is somewhat 
difficult to state, it is believed that the plan of those states 
may be stated as follows : 
If the death of an employee is caused by the wrongful 
act of a third person, a cause of a·ction vests immediately 
in the surviving and designated beneficiaries of the de-
ceased. The third person, wrongdoer, is in the language 
of the statute "liable" to the dependents who have been 
damaged by the death of the employee. (Sec. 48-118 Neb. 
Statutes, 1929.) The Compensation Act does not disturb 
or affect this liability. (Of course, if it deprives the third 
person of the defense of contributory negligence, then to 
that extent the preceding statement is inaccurate.) The 
beneficiaries designated by the statute may have compen-
sation from the employer, and they may also nave damages 
from the third person. In the language of the Red Wing 
case (203 N. W. 622), "he (referring to the injured em-
ployee) could pursue both." No election is required in 
either Minnesota or Nebraska. (Excepting common purpose 
statute of Minnesota.) 
In the language of the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
(Gleason v. Sing, supra), "the third party liability has for 
its basis tortious conduct on the part of one who is not 
the employer resulting in harm to the injured workman. The 
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10 
amount of recovery is measured by the common law stan-
dard of damages" (except where the third person and the 
employer are co-operating to a common purpose.) 
And again: 
"The employer's liability under the Compensation 
Act on the other hand is not based upon negligence 
but depends upon whether the workman suffered 
an injury caused by the accident arising out of and 
in the course of his employment." 
And again: 
"We think it is apparent that the present Act 
recognizes and preserves the common law liability 
resting upon a third party's negligence in cases of 
this nature. Therefore, the receipt of compensation 
by the injured employee does not deprive him of his 
right of recovery upon the facts here shown." 
The taking of compensation in Minnesota or Nebraska 
is not a surrender of the vested right to damages; (nor 
is it a refu.sal of a.n inchoate proffered right, as it i8 im: 
Utah). If the beneficiaries take compensation from the 
master or the insurance carrier, and thereafter recover 
damages from the third person, the master or insurance 
carrier has in effect a lien on the judgment for damages 
to the extent of the compensation that has been paid by 
the master or insurance carrier. If the master or insur-
ance carrier sues and recovers, he then keeps out of the 
amount recovered the compensation that has been paid and 
the expenses incurred in the litigation. If the designated 
beneficiaries or dependents sue, the master or insurance 
carrier can make himself or itself a party, and thereby 
protect the interest that it has acquired by paying com-
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11 
pensation. (These rights as against the third person are 
property rights, not in any quasi-contractual sense nor at 
common law, but because of the survival statutes. (146 
N. W. 895, supra.) 
The primary purpose of these statutes in the States 
of Nebraska, Minnesota and Wisconsin is to protect the 
employee in case of injury or his dependents i:p. case of 
death. They have an incidental purpose of protecting the 
employer or insurance carrier if any recovery is had from 
the third person who wrongfully causes injury to or death 
of the employee. The master is relieved of all liability for 
negligence, and at the same time he is compeled to pay com-
pensation, even though such master is guilty of no fault. 
The employer or insurance carrier, in the prosecution of 
the action against the third person, stands in the shoes of 
the employee. (279 N. W. 76, supra.) 
The Utah plan is basically entirely different from that 
prevailing in Minnesota, Nebraska or Wisconsin. 
Hunt v. Bankline, 35 Fed. (2d) 136 (1929) 
Bruso's Case, 295 Mass. 531; 4 N. E. (2d) 308 
(1936) 
Lang v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 217 N.Y. S. 277 
(1928) 
Lang v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 247 N. Y. 551; 
161 N. E. 178 (1928) 
Orange City Ice Co. v. Texas Compensation Ins. 
Co., 278 Fed. 8 (5· C. C. A.; 1922) 
Some of these and many other cases which might be 
cited are predicated upon statutes which do require an 
election on the part of the injured employee or his depen-
dents in case of his death. Such statutes are in direct con-
trast to those of Nebraska and her associates, Wisconsin 
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and Minnesota. Under these statutes, when the dependents 
make an election to take and are awarded compensation, 
then they never obtain or acquire a right to sue the third 
person, wrongdoer. This right is not transferred from 
them but it is never acquired by them. The insurance 
carrier, when it sues, sues in its own right, and not as an 
assignee, statutory or otherwise. (278 Fed. 8; 65 Fed, 
(2d) 650). It cannot be an assignee, without an assignor. 
In Utah, upon the death of an employee, if it is caused 
by the wrongful act of a third person, the right to recover 
does not vest until there has been an election by the de-
pendents of the deceased. They may at their option have 
compensation from the master or insurance carrier, or they 
may have their action for damages against the third per-
son. (Sec. 42-1-58.) This is one part of the statute that 
needs no construction or interpretation. If counsel for 
plaintiffs is looking for "the intent of the legislature" (ap-
pellants' brief, P. 9), then here he may find it without 
suffering from a laborious study of common law actions 
and common law pleadings. Even a perusal of the Code will 
be unnecessary. 
This plain provision can be amended by the legisla-
ture and the injured employee or his dependents may by 
such amendment be granted both compensation and dam-
ages, but no amount of "social and economic adjustment" 
(plaintiffs' brief, P. 11) can avoid its effect on the mind 
of an honest man, whether he appears: in behalf of an in-
suran~e company, a packing company, or some other person 
more or less fortunate. 
Under this Utah plan the dependents cannot take the 
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benefits of compensation from the master and then the 
benefits of the action for damages against the third per-
son. Emphatic but ill-timed assertions, about "gross neg-
ligence" (plaintiffs' brief, P. 11) cannot properly influence 
anyone to disregard an open-eyed election by dependents, 
advised as they were by unusually zealous and public-spirited 
counsel. 
In the absence of fraud on the part of the defendant, 
the election of the plaintiffs stands. Even fraud on the 
part of the insurance carrier does not avoid an election to 
take damages. 
Tews v. C. T. Hanks Coal Co., 267 Mich. 466; 
255 N. W. 227 (1934) 
This case is but a partial illustration of the effects 
of a traffic in compensation rights so ardently defended 
by counsel for plaintiffs (Plaintiffs' brief, P. 11). It seems 
that the insurance carrier was making an "economic ad-
justment." In so doing it perpetrated a fraud on an em-
ployee who was suffering from the amputation of a leg. 
By false promises this insurance carrier induced the in-
jured man to accept $2000 from a railroad corporation who 
had injured the employee at a railroad crossing. After the 
plaintiff had received the $2000, he filed an application for 
compensation from his employer, as he had been told by the 
insurance adjuster he might do. The Compensation Board 
held that the representations made by the insurance carrier 
prevented the application of the statutory rule otherwise 
following an election; but the Supreme Court of Michigan 
was compelled to deny compensation, saying in part: 
"The Compensation Law is in derogation of the 
common law, and therefore its measure of relief 
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may not be extended beyond its express terms; it 
is a legislative creation permitting no enlargement 
by principles of equity or common-law adaptations. 
It is arbitrary, and, where it speaks, nothing can be 
added nor changed by judicial pronouncement. It 
imposes liability upon operatives under its provisions 
and measures exclusive relief in its own terms. This 
law permits an employee, injured in the course of 
his employment by the negligence of a third party, 
to have compensation from his employer or from the 
third party, but not from both. The employee may 
elect his remedy, but cannot, even by agreement 
with the employer, have remedy in part from the 
third party for a tort and in part against his em-
ployer under the Compensation Law. The remedy 
against the third party is at common law and that 
under the Compensation Law wholly foreign to the 
common law. The two laws bear no relation, and 
their remedies cannot be mixed, except by express 
statutory authority. Remedy had under one wholly 
excludes the employee from the other. 
"The statutes of some states permit proceedings 
against both the employer and the negligent third 
person, but double recovery is not permitted." 
If the brief of counsel for defendant has not convinced 
this Court that the plai.ntiffs are seeking in the instant 
case to recover in their own right and not as assignees~ of 
the insurance carrier, then it is submitted that the brief 
filed by the plaintiffs will have that effect. The plaintiffs 
do not rely upon or defend the so-called "assignment." By 
their silence they admit that subrogation is not assign-
ment. They did not allege payment of the award of com· 
pensation, first, because the award itself would disprove 
payment, and, second, because on the theory of plaintiffs, 
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the award paid or unpaid is immaterial. It, according to. 
the plaintiffs' theory, is of no concern either to the defen-
dant or to the courts. 
It is submitted that if the legislature of this state had 
intended the dependents of a deceased employee to have 
the right to compensation, and then conjunctively and a.t 
the same time have the right to recover damages from the 
third person who negligently caused the death of the em-
ployee, "it would have been easy to say so," instead of pro-
viding in express terms for an election by the dependents 
as to these alternative remedies; and because the legisla-
ture did not "say so," rational individuals are compelled to 
conclude that it did not intend that either the injured em-
ployee, or his dependents in case of death, should have a 
double recovery. ("Easy to say so" has become a rule of 
construction.) 
II. 
THE SUBROGATION OF THE MASTER OR ITS INSUR-
ANCE CARRIER TO THE RIGHT OF ACTION TO SUE 
FOR DAMAGES CANNOT TAKE EFFECT UNDER THE 
STATUTE UNTIL THE AWARD OF COMPENSATION 
HAS BEEN PAID. SUCH SUBROGATION DOES NOT 
CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE ACTION FOR 
WRONGFUL DEATH FROM ONE THAT IS NON-ASSIGN-
ABLE TO ONE THAT IS ASSIGNABLE. THE CHAR-
ACTER OF THE LIABILITY OF THE THIRD PERSON 
IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE PROVIDING FOR 
SUBROGATION. 
It is believed it has been established that no right ever 
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vested in the plaintiffs to institute or maintain this ac-
tion, and consequently no right was ever transferred from 
them by the statute. One cannot give up or have taken 
from him that which he never had. 
Plaintiffs cite in their brief City of Red Wing v. Eich-
inger, 163 Minn. 54; 203 N. W. 622 (1925). In that case the 
city carried compensation insurance with the Travelers In-
surance Company. A streetsweeper was injured. He ap-
plied for and received an award of compensation, and the 
insurance company paid that compensation. The city then 
brought suit against Eichinger, claiming that the injury of 
the streetsweeper was, due to the negligence of the defen-
dant. The statute of Minnesota recognized the insurer as 
such. In this respect it is like the statute of Utah. The 
statute providing for subrogation, however, was different 
because it provided for a subrogation when the employer 
has paid or has obliga"bed hims;elf to pay an award of com-
pensation. 
The Court held that the city was not obligated to pay 
anything and had paid nothing, and consequently it could 
not maintain the action. In so deciding the Court said: 
"A statutory subrogation has the same char-
acteristics as if it were a creature of equity. It is 
enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the 
ends of substantial justice, and does not depend upon 
any contractual relation between the parties." 
Henderson Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Owensboro Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 192 Ky. 322; 233 S. W. 743 
(1921) 
In the Kentucky case there had been an award of com· 
pensation to an injured employee and that award had been 
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paid by the insurance carrier. The statute of Kentucky 
provided as follows : 
"The employer, having paid the compensation 
or having become liable therefor, shall have the right 
to recover in his own name." 
It was held that the statute gave no right of action to 
the insurance company, and that the employer, not having 
paid or become liable to pay, could not bring and maintain 
the action. 
It is quite clear from the Kentucky case that without 
the aid of a statute the insurance company would have no 
equitable ground for subrogation. The insurance company 
is in the indemnity business and accumulates a large fund 
by the collection of premiums, and when it pays it approp-
riates from such fund such part as is necessary in the given 
case to satisfy the award. It has lost nothing whatever. 
(Such. was the reasoning of the Kentucky Court.) 
But the Utah statute recognizes the right of the insur-
ance carrier to recover. That right cannot be disputed, pro-
viding the insurance company complies with the condition 
precedent stated in the statute. The insurance carrier must 
have paid the award before it can become vested with the 
right of action. 
Broderick v. Puget, Sound Traction Light & 
Power Co., 86 Wash. 399; 150 Pac. 616 
(1915) 
In that case it appeared that an automobile belonging 
to the plaintiff had come into collision with a freight car 
owned by the defendant company. Her automobile wasi fully 
repaired by the Broadway Automobile Company, whose 
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duty it was to take care of such automobile. No insurance 
was ever paid by the insurance carrier and the plaintiff 
paid out nothing for the repairs. The plaintiff undertook 
to contend that she was a trustee of an express trust, and 
when that contention failed she contended that the defen-
dant was not in a position to object to the action being pros-
ecuted in the name of the appellant, but the Supreme Court 
of Washington said that her automobile having been fully 
repaired, she had no right to compensation from the person 
causing the injury. Therefore the dismissal of the trial 
court was affirmed. 
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Indian-
apolis C. & T. Co., Ind. App., 139 N. E. 200 
(1923) 
This case involved an elective statute, in the elective 
respect not unlike that of Utah. It was held that if the 
employee elected to take compensation and accepted pay-
ment from his employer, he thereby surrendered whatever 
right of action he had to recover from the person whose neg-
ligence caused his injury. 
The Indiana statute provided: 
"and if compensation is awarded and accepted under 
this Act, the employer having paid the compensa-
tion, or having become liable therefor, may collect'.', 
etc. 
Under the policy of insurance carried by the employer 
the subrogation did not take place until the insurance car-
rier had paid, and it was held that the insurance company's 
right of action "did not accrue until the compensation had 
been paid." 
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Now, it will be noticed that these statutes from other 
states permit subrogation to take place when the insurance 
carrier has become obligated to pay, but in Utah the insur-
ance carrier does not become subrogated until it has paid 
the compensation awarded. The law seems to be well settled 
that if these beneficiaries should die before the award made 
in this case had been fully paid, then all installments that 
had become due and payable during the lifetime of the bene-
ficiaries would belong to their estate, but that as to install-
ments yet to become due after their deaths, neither the in-
surance company nor the employer would be required to 
pay the same. 
There is some apparent conflict in the holdings of the 
courts of various states, but such apparent conflict is due 
to a difference in the survivorship statutes of those states. 
Tierney v. Tierney & Co., 176 Minn. 464; 223 
N. W. 773 (1929) 
In this case the Supreme Court of Minnesota said: 
"That the right" (to compensation) "is purely 
statutory and does not extend beyond the life of the 
beneficiary unless the statute so provides; that the 
right, being non-assignable, does not survive to others 
at death; that it grew out of the contract of employ-
ment, is in lieu of wages, is personal like the con-
tract of employment, and is terminated by death, 
as that would have terminated the contract out of 
which it grew; that it is intended for the personal 
benefit of the beneficiary, and is not a vested right 
nor transmissible to others, and that, the statute 
having specified the rights granted to dependents, 
they possess only those so specified." 
See also 51 A. L. R., 1446 for a collection of the au-
thorities upon this subject. 
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It is believed it may be assumed in this case that it 
will be impossible to determine the loss of the insurance 
carrier except upon full payment of the award, but the in-
surance carrier in this case does not allege that it has paid 
anything, and under the statute it cannot acquire any cause 
of action until it has paid in full, or until for some reason it 
has been discharged of any further obligation to pay. 
For the purpose of argument, however, and for that 
purpose only, let it be assumed that the subrogation has be-
come complete. That subrogation did not come about by 
virtue of any contract, but it resulted solely from and be-
cause of the statute, and in the language of the Red Wing 
case, it had all the characteristics of an equitable subro-
gation. When that subrogation takes place, then the charac-
ter of the third person's liability is not changed or altered in 
the slightest respect. The insurance carrier then recovers 
upon only the cause of action to enforce the liability in 
tort for negligently killing the deceased. That is the only 
basis of the action which the insurance carrier is given the 
right to maintain. (279 N. W. 78, supra.) 
If the cause of action against the third person is· a 
property right, i. e. if it survives in favor of the estate of 
the person damaged and against the estate of the wrong-
doer, then it is ass,ignable, and this is true independent of 
the existence of Section 42·-1-58. The enactment of that 
section did not provide for assignability or survivability. 
The situation is the exact opposite of McGarvey v. 
Independent Oil & Grease Co., 156 Wis. 580; 146 N. W. 
895 (1914). In Wisconsin causes of action for personal 
injuries. are property, i.e. they survive and have been made 
to survive from a very early date. The plaintiff McGarvey 
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was injured. He applied for and obtained compensation 
from his employer. That compensation was paid and then 
the employer assigned its claim against the wrongdoer to 
the plaintiff. The question arose as to the assignability of 
the cause of action, and the Court said : 
"Before its enactment" (referring to the stat-
ute) "the employer could purchase an employee's 
claim for damages against one who had wrongfully 
injured him in his person or his property, and en-
force it in his own name. In such a case the amount 
paid for the claim would not militate, necessarily, 
against its enforceability, or the measure of the 
recovery, or in any way affect the claim as to assign-
ability. The letter of the statute, as well as its pur-
pose, seems to be that, in case of a compulsory pur-
chase of such a claim the nature of it shall not at all 
be changed." 
It was held that because the claim was assignable be-
fore the Workmen's Compensation Statute was passed, it 
was assignable after that event. The Compensation Statute 
did not destroy its assignability, nor did it create that as-
signability. 
It is submitted that the plaintiffs here, by reason of the 
fact that they applied for and received an award of com-
pensation, never acquired any cause of action against the 
defendant; that the insurance carrier has not yet acquired 
such cause of action because it has not paid the award, and 
when the subrogation is complete, and not until then, the 
insurance company will have acquired a cause of action 
against the defendant if the defendant wrongfully and neg-
ligently caused the death of the deceased; that the statute 
providing for this subrogation does not provide for any as-
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signment, and that the subrogation does not change the 
character of the cause of action. 
III. 
THIS COURT HAS NO POWER TO REVERSE THIS 
JUDGMENT MERELY TO PERMIT THE PLAINTIFFS 
TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT. 
Article VIII of the State Constitution vests the judicial 
power of this state in the senate, sitting as a court of im-
peachment, in a supreme court, in district courts and in 
justices of the peace, and then it provides for the legisla-
tive creation of such other courts as may from time to 
time be established. 
Section 4 of Article VIII grants this court original jur-
isdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibi-
tion, quo warranto and habeas corpus. It then provides: 
"In other cases the Supreme Court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction only, and power to issue 
writs necessary and proper for the exercise of that 
jurisdiction." 
In Section 9 of Article VIII it is provided as follows: 
"From all final judgments of the district courts, 
there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The appeal shall be upon the record made in the 
court below and under such regulations as may be 
provided by law. In equity cases the appeal may be 
on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the 
appeal shall be on questions of law alone." (Italics 
ours) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
Section 104-41-1 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
among other things provides : 
"The appeal shall be upon the record made in 
the district court. In equity cases the appeal may 
be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at 
law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone." 
(Of course the statute was of necessity in accord with 
the Constitution.) 
Even prior to statehood the Supreme Court of the 
Territory of Utah had no power to review and decide ques-
tions of fact in law cases, and matters not urged in the 
court below could not be first urged on appeal. 
Mr. District Judge Pratt, speaking as a member of this 
court, set forth the law upon this subject with absolute 
accuracy in 1919. 
Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah, 151; 
184 Pac. 802 (1919) 
He wrote the opinion in the case cited, and among other 
things said : 
"But as the right or power to review and decide 
controverted questions of fact on appeal in law 
cases did not exist prior to statehood and did exist, 
as now by constitutional provision, in equity cases, 
the constitutional restriction of appeals in law cases 
to the review of questions of law alone was probably 
intended to preserve this distinction without mater-
ial change." (184 Pac. 807) 
Without further citation of authority, and because the 
provision of the Constitution itself is sufficient, it can be 
said that this court in this action at law has appellate jur-
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isdiction and that only. In the exercise of that jurisdiction 
it can decide only such questions of law as are presented 
upon appeal. Assignments of error are necessary to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court. Only matters challenged by 
appeal and assignments of error are presented for review. 
"This court is not authorized, either by statute 
or rules of the court, to review any ruling of the 
district court unless error is assigned designating 
or specifying the alleged error." 
Perrin v. Union Pacific R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 
Pac. 405 (1921) 
(This quotation is from Page 411) 
The only question of law that is presented, {)r that can 
be involved in this case, cannot be stated otherwise than as 
follows: Does the complaint state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs and 
against the defendant? 
If this question must be answered in the negative, as 
it seems that it must be, then the judicial controversy be-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendant is ended and is 
beyond debate. 
Von Drachenfels v. Doolittle, 77 Cal. 295·; 19 
Pac. 518 (1888) 
What is a question of law except an issue of law; a 
matter of law in dispute? The demurrer in this case pre-
sented that issue of law to the trial court. F'or the purposes 
of the demurrer it conceded all facts well pleaded in the 
.complaint. It was then contended by the defendant that on 
the facts pleaded in the complaint there was no cause of 
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action. The trial court sustained that contention, and there-
by decided the only issue at law that has ever existed in this 
case. If the plaintiff had asked leave to amend, and the trial 
court had denied that request and the plaintiffs had ap-
pealed and assigned that denial of the right to amend as 
error, then this Court would have had before it a question 
of law which would have involved a review of the trial 
court's discretion. The question would have been: Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion in denying the right to 
amend? 
But the trial court did not deny the plaintiffs a right 
to amend their complaint. On the other hand, the trial 
court affirmatively granted leave to amend and the plain-
tiffs refused to amend. That is the record in this court. 
When the plaintiffs refused to amend, after waiting 
the statutory time the trial court entered judgment for 
the defendant. 
Then the plaintiffs appealed and the error assigned 
was that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer 
of the defendant. This record presents no other question 
of law than that pres~nted by the plaintiffs, appellants here. 
The matter of amendment of the complaint was for 
the District Court. It was a matter within that court's, dis-
cretion. Of course, that court could not abuse its discretion 
and that court did not, because it allowed the plaintiffs to 
amend and the plaintiffs refused to amend. The District 
Court did not commit any error in entering judgment for 
the defendant. The only possibility of error on the part of 
the District Court was that of sustaining the demurrer. As 
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long as the District Court adhered to that ruling, then 
upon the refusal of the plaintiffs to amend, the District 
Court could not do otherwise than enter judgment for the 
defendant. 
Let it be assumed for the purpose of argument, and 
for that purpose only, that the plaintiffs' counsel made a 
mistake in refusing to amend (they did not), and that such 
mistake was one from which relief could be obtained under 
Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended 
by Chapter 121 of the Laws of Utah, 1939. It would be an 
extreme case, but the writer can conceive of such a case. It 
will likely never happen. 
Suppose, for instance, that there was collusion between 
counsel for defendant and counsel for plaintiffs and that 
the plaintiffs' counsel was not true to his clients, and for 
that reason deliberately and dishonestly refused to amend, 
then, perhaps, the plaintiffs could get new counsel and make 
proof of the fact of collusion, tender an amended complaint, 
ask the court to set aside the judgment, and allow the com-
plaint to be filed. Thi~, of course, would require a showing 
of diligence on the part of the plaintiffs and the facts would 
be determined by the trial court. Under the section just 
referred to it is believed that the trial court would have 
jurisdiction to grant the proper relief, and if the trial court 
did not grant it, then an appeal could be taken and the 
matter presented to this court as a question of law. 
Upon what would the jurisdiction of the trial court 
depend? Under the section above referred to the applica-
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tion for relief must be made within a reasonable time "not 
exceeding ninety days after the making or occurrence of 
the judgment, order or other proceeding sought to be re-
lieved from." That is the language of the statute, and unless 
the application was made within ninety days the District 
Court would have ~jurisdiction. 
The judgment in the case at bar was made and entered 
on the 17th day of May, 1940. No application for relief was 
made to the District Court, and the appeal from the judg-
ment was taken to this court 87 or 88 days after the entry 
of the judgment in the district court. The date of the appeal 
was August 13, 1940, and in this court no assignment of 
error has been made, or could be made, involving the right 
of the plaintiffs to amend, because they were given that 
right by the trial court, and refused that right. At no time 
have counsel for plaintiffs asserted that plaintiffs should 
be allowed to amend, and the compensation award, a certified 
copy of which has been presented to this Court for the 
purpose of showing that no amendment could be made, does 
show that no amendment can be made. 
City of Durango v. Luttrell, 18 Colo. 123; 31 
Pac. 853 (1892) 
Quotation from a unanimous opinion of the Colorado 
Court: 
"To justify the reversal of a judgment ren-
dered in a civil action by a court having jurisdiction 
of the subject-matter and the parties, the record 
brought to this. court for review must disclose-
First, some manifest error affecting the substantial 
rights of the party seeking such reversal; second, 
such error must appear either in the record proper, 
or, if committed in respect to some interlocutory or-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
der, ruling, or decision, not a part of the record 
proper, the same must have been brought to the at-
tention of the trial court in such apt time and man-
ner as to afford opportunity for correction, and the 
record of such error must be regularly preserved by 
bill of exceptions or otherwise ; and third, the matter 
relied on for reversal must be duly assigned for 
error upon the record brought to this court." 
See also In Re Kingsley's Estate, 93 Cal. 576; 29 Pac. 
244 (1892) 
Quotation from California Supreme Court: 
"With the process of reasoning by which the 
court reached its conclusion we have nothing to do. 
That may have been erroneous and the ruling cor-
rect. To justify a reversal, it is incumbent upon the 
appellant to show an erroneous ruling, and not merely 
bad reasoning or mistaken views of the law." 
2 Encyc. of Pleading and Practice, Pages 499-
507 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion let it be said that to the writer of this 
brief it seems certain that this Court has no power to re-
verse a judgment as a mere matter of grace (ex mera 
gratia). The Constitution created the court. It stated that 
court's jurisdiction, and it submitted that the court cannot 
lawfully assume any greater jurisdiction than that granted 
by the Constitution, viz. : to determine the only question of 
law presented by the record. The appellants raised the 
only question of law that is possible from that record. If 
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that question is decided against the appellants, then it is 
submitted that the judgment must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARLON E. WILSON, 
ROBERT C. WILSON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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